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BOOK REVIEW
THE ECONOMICS OF COMMON PROPERTY:
A REVIEW OF TWO RECENT BOOKS
Proceedings of the Conference on
Common Property Resource Management
and
The Question of the Commons,
The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources
I
Questions about appropriate institutions for managing natural resources
have received scholarly attention for a long time. Much of this attention
has been directed at the study of alternative public policy regimes; another
focus has been on sorting out the performance characteristics of different
property rights institutions. The latter has received something of a fillip
in recent years from the burgeoning political interest in privatization.
Recently a spate of books and papers by economists has appeared showing
the efficiency benefits that would apparently flow from using privateproperty institutions to a greater extent in managing a variety of natural
resources, from air to wildlife.' The recrudescence of the politics of
privatization is undoubtedly a congenial development for neoclassical
economics, whose major analytical tool-market analysis--is more easily
brought to bear in a world of individual property.
Not everyone has jumped on this analytical bandwagon, however. In
fact, something of a counterattack has been launched by those who see
the institution of common property as a viable alternative to private
property or, at the very least, as warranting closer, and perhaps more
sympathetic, examination. Recently two substantial books have appeared
that focus on the problems and potentials of common-property institutions
in the management of natural resources. Each is a collection of conference
papers. Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource
Management2 is a collection of papers presented at a conference sponsored
by the National Research Council in 1985; it contains 24 papers on
common-property use, not counting opening and closing comments. The
Question of the Commons, The Cultureand Ecology of CommunalResources3
contains 18 papers, most of which were given at several conferences of
anthropologists in 1983 and 1984.
I. R. Liroff, Air Pollution Offsets: Trading, Selling and Banking (1980); Amachee, Toleson, and
Willett, The Economics of Fatal Mistakes: Fiscal Mechanisms for Preserving Endangered Predators,
Pub. Pol'y, Summer 1972; for a number of recent volumes having privatization as their central
theme, see, e.g., R. Stroup & J. Baden, Natural Resources: Bureaucratic Myths and Environmental
Management, San Francisco Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research (1983).
2. National Research Council (1986) (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press).
3. B. McCay & J. Acheson eds. (1987) (Tucson: University of Arizona Press).
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Taken together, these books provide a rich and extensive collection of
studies on common-property institutions throughout the world. Almost
all of them are case studies, dealing with particular natural resources in
particular societies; almost all of them study contemporaneous resource
institutions (that is to say, they are not histories per se, even though there
are frequent references to precursor institutions); and almost all of them
focus on resources in economically less-developed societies. The papers
provide us with a convenient opportunity to review and consider a wide
variety of common-property resources and their role in natural resource
development and management.
This paper attempts a partial review of these collections. It is partial
because the number and diversity of the papers preclude a totally comprehensive summary within a reasonable compass. Additionally, there are
too many different perspectives from which one might view the papers.
This paper therefore approaches them from the standpoint of economics,
asking, in essence, what riches of empirical observation and conceptual
insight are offered to those of us for whom the various economic models
of common property are standard analytical tools. The economic perspective is important not only because it is surely one of the most relevant
ones for the study of property institutions, but also because most of the
authors tend to use the standard economic model as a negative reference
point with which to motivate their analyses. That is, they lean toward
the view that standard economic models are too overly pessimistic about
the viability of common-property resources; the models are also suspect
because they provide the conceptual and theoretical underpinning for the
current political embrace of privatization.
II
Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management (hereinafter called CP) begins with several theory papers to
provide conceptual structure for the empirical pieces that follow. A later
piece by Ostrom (CP) also focuses on conceptual matters. Oakerson
provides a number of "key attributes shared broadly by common property
problems .... "These essentially reduce to four dimensions: (1) technical
and physical features that determine the degree of interdependence among
users of a commons; (2) factors related to exclusion of non-commoners;
(3) governance institutions used by commoners and others; and (4) results,
that is, how such resources actually get used. Oakerson also states, in
his first paragraph, the central problem of commons management, "how
to coordinate individual users to attain an optimal rate of production or
consumption for the whole community" (p. 13). This is notable because
few of the later authors refer explicitly to the notion of optimality. Runge
focuses on the types of interdependence that common-property users are
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likely to face. He presents his views, familiar from his earlier writings,
that the typical game situation faced by commoners is not a prisoner's
dilemma, but a game containing multiple Nash equilibria, some of which
may be superior to others. This will be referred to below.
The rest of the volume is organized around major resource types: fish
and wildlife, water, range and pasture land, agricultural land, and forest
and bushland. The analytical perspectives taken are varied--economics,
public administration and political science, anthropology-and the papers
are for the most part descriptive. Fourteen of the twenty case studies are
of commons use in countries of Africa, in India, and Nepal. The paper
by Cordell and McKean on Brazilian fishing villages strikes a theme that
is repeated by many other authors: commons management systems worked
out by local groups would have continued to be effective if these groups
had been left alone; that is, if they had not been, at some point in time,
open to forces of economic and/or demographic development, to competition for the resource they were using, or to political realignments that
changed their political relationships with outside groups. A similar theme
is expressed in the papers of Cruz (Philippines); Kisangani (Zaire); Thomson, Feeny, and Oakerson (Niger); and Artz, Norton, and O'Rourke
(Morocco).
The Question of the Commons, The Culture and Ecology of Communal
Resources (hereinafter called QC) contains a collection of papers authored
for the most part by anthropologists.' The papers are more self-consciously grounded in a particular discipline, unlike the more eclectic
papers of CP. The papers in QC are divided into three groups, not counting
the introductory chapter of the editors. The first section is subtitled "Conservation and the Commons" and addresses the question: Are small common-property using societies capable of developing sufficient restraint to
conserve the resources on which they apparently rely? The second section
is entitled "Specifying the Commons." The editors say, in the first chapter,
that "Common property ... is logical under some circumstances"; the
papers in this section attempt to identify what these "certain conditions"
are. The last section of QC is called "The State and the Commons" with
the papers focusing on the interrelationships among levels of governance-local versus regional or national-and the implications for commonly-used resources. The papers in this volume are also geographically
diverse: several papers on the United States, three on Canada, as well as
papers on Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and a number of less developed countries.
Given the number of papers in these volumes it seems inadvisable to
4. Interestingly, there is almost no overlap among authors in the two books, considering only the
substantive papers, and not opening and closing remarks and summaries. Only one author (Berkes)
repeats in the two books, and his two papers are on totally different countries.
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attempt a simple paper-by-paper summary. Accordingly, the following
discussion is organized around a series of themes that suggest themselves
on reading the papers. References to specific papers are made within these
sections. It is not my intention to dwell on the negative. Anyone who
sits down and reads through these collections must come away deeply
impressed with the depth and variety of experience that people around
the world have had with common-property institutions, and with the
central role these institutions have played in many societies. While acknowledging the richness of the papers, however, I want to concentrate
on questions that seem to remain unresolved and issues that could benefit
from further analysis. The topics to be discussed are: (1) the role of
standard economic models in studying common-property regimes; (2) the
criteria to be used in evaluating common-property institutions; (3) coercion versus voluntarism in common property; (4) resource use de jure
and resource use de facto; (5) common property and economic growth;
and (6) the political economy of common-property use.
III
From the general perspective of economics, perhaps the most challenging question raised by these papers is the role of standard economic
models in the analysis of common-property institutions. While it would
be unfair, and unhelpful, to regard all the authors as speaking with a
single voice on the matter, it is clear that the general tenor of the collections is antagonistic to these models. They are regarded as too restrictive in institutional detail and too inaccurate in underlying behavioral
assumptions to be useful. The standard models, furthermore, are regarded
with suspicion because they are judged to be biased toward the justification
of private, or individual, property.
To what extent is this criticism justified? Much of it may stem from
differences in methodological premises. Many of the authors, especially
in QC, approach their studies from an anthropological perspective. Behavior is assumed to be norm driven, in contradistinction to behavior in
economic models which is understood as interest driven. Peters (QC),
for example, studies changes in grazing rights in Botswana. Over the last
few decades grazing areas around new wells have been appropriated by
small groups of ranchers (numbering between four and fifty); boundaries
have been defined in areas that were once open range. Peters explains
the evolution of these new property rights as a process of "competition
in meanings" (QC, p. 192). Taylor (QC) studies an Irish fishing community, the citizens of which manage collectively the effort expended on
a nearby fishery. The fishing is technically illegal because it evades fishing
regulations set by outside authorities. When it was proposed to the vil-
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lagers that they buy the fishery and become, as it were, residual claimants
of the enterprise, they refused. Taylor concludes from this that the notion
of collective ownership would have violated the villagers' sense of community; collective ownership would have involved conflict, which would
have violated the norms of sociability that apparently prevailed in the
community.
In these two cases, conventional explanations would have been based
on self-interested behavior among members of the affected communities.
In Botswana, collections of individuals sought to appropriate resources
that had become more valuable when water was made available; in Ireland, the change in property rights was rejected because too many people
in the community must have seen themselves as likely to be made worse
off.5 We have, in effect, competing paradigms. This being the case, must
one be right and the other wrong? If so, we must presumably develop
rigorous tests of the competing models. None of the papers in these
volumes had the stated objective of undertaking such a test. On the other
hand, these two perspectives may not be inconsistent. Perhaps the only
thing we can do at this point is acknowledge the different methodological
approaches, hold judgment, and give more analytical attention to the
conceptual relationship between norm-driven behavior and interest-driven
behavior.
Rejection of the standard game-theoretic type model stems largely from
the view, especially among the authors in QC, that these models incorporate individualistic, selfish, short-run behavior on the part of commons
users (see, e.g., Berkes, QC, p. 67). While there are good reasons for
wanting to go beyond these simple models, it is a pity that researchers
are willing to overlook their limited but powerful virtues on the very
grounds that they are too limited. The point of the standard models is to
explore the nature of the interaction between individuals and others (individual or group); they may be cast in such a way as to capture any type
of interaction, selfishness, altruism, blind followship, cultural domination, or what have you. For example, Runge (CP) argues that commonproperty problems are more usefully modeled with games of multiple
Nash equilibria (assurance games) than with prisoners' dilemma games.
While this seems conceptually doubtful, it does have the virtue of directing
the attention of researchers to the study of the actual payoff structures
facing people in common-property situations. It must be added that,

5. A further methodological conflict is inherent in the statement by Peters, "the analyst of commons
systems has to understand reality as it appears to users of the commons," supra note 3, at 178. The
requirement that explanations be in terms of the "reality" of the people studied seems highly
restrictive. It is certainly true that standard economic models are not cast in these terms.
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unfortunately, none of the papers in these two volumes undertakes this
type of empirical analysis.
But if in this case the rejection of the standard model is perhaps premature, there are other perspectives from which the limitations of that
model are more clearly seen. One of these is the matter of change from
one institutional regime to another. Peters makes this point in her interesting study of grazing lands in Botswana. She shows clearly how over
the long-run there was an evolution, from a system consisting of large
numbers of relatively small commons centered on areas controlled by
indigenous political leaders, to a large commons where the old dividing
lines between the smaller areas were broken down, back toward a system
of smaller commons ("grazing syndicates") centered around a system of
privately-owned water sources. Of course, the standard model of common-property use studies the use rates of pre-defined resources; it has
nothing to say about the shift from one system of commons to another.'
Perhaps the main objection by these authors of the standard models is
the view that common-property resources invariably imply full rent dissipation. As a point of hard analytics, this is not quite correct. Perhaps
the best known of the recent neoclassical models, that of Dasgupta and
Heal, has partial rent dissipation as the likely outcome, except when the
number of exploiting firms is indefinitely large, because of uncoerced
Nash-type behavioral responses on the part of commoners. But the authors
in these volumes wish to go beyond this, stressing the organizational
responses that commons may make when rent dissipation threatens. Full
or partial rent dissipation implies that there are gains from restraint, and
therefore gains to be had from organizing that restraint. Standard economic models of the commons have virtually nothing to say here because
the economics of organization is not a part of the theory. This criticism
seems valid, and of such import that it is readdressed in Section VIII.
IV
Closely related to questions about the role of economic models is the
issue of the criteria to be used in evaluating real-world cases of commons
management. For economists who may be narrowly fixated on the criterion of efficiency, these papers may be seen as a good antidote because
they employ, directly or indirectly, a wide variety of criteria. Oakerson
seems to put the matter clearly in an early conceptual paper meant to
provide a framework for subsequent empirical papers. The central problem of commons management, he says, is "how to coordinate individual
users to attain an optimal rate of production or consumption for the whole
6. 1 have tried to address this problem in a rigorous way in "The Evolution of Property Rights,"
mimeo, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
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community" (CP, p. 13). This is notable because virtually none of the
authors, in either volume, attempt to compare empirical use rates with
some notion of optimal rates.
The criterion that perhaps is used most often by the authors to evaluate
common-property situations is the physical or ecological status of the
resource. According to this criterion, successful commons management
is that which leads to conservation of the resource; unsuccessful management is that which leads to the physical degradation of the resource.
Another criterion widely used by these authors is equity. In some cases,
distributional goals are viewed as the raison d'etre for common property;
in others equity is regarded as one of the prime criteria to be used by
successful commons management organizations. The collections of papers
are remarkable, however, for how little they contain of hard data on
distribution of income, or wealth, or access by users of common-property
resources.
This is an important point because, in the few papers containing explicit
comment on the distribution of access, there is substantial documentation
of inequality. Hunt (CP) refers to unequal irrigation water allocations
where the rules call for equal shares; Easter and Palanisami (CP) discuss
similar outcomes in Indian irrigation projects; Gupta (CP) talks of inequities in common grazing areas that led to the collapse of the common
pasture institutions; and McKean (CP) discusses the large inequalities in
common-property villages of Tokugawa, Japan.
All of these papers suggest that equity is a matter to be looked at more
closely. Reasonably high degrees of equality of outcome, far from being
automatic results of common-property tenures, may be just as hard to
achieve there as in any other institution. That would be consistent with
Blum's conclusions after his massive study of European agricultural villages from the 15th to 19th centuries-villages that made great use of a
variety of commons arrangements: they were not egalitarian because there
were important wealth differences, but they performed their functions
"with a reasonable degree of success. ' "Functions" in this context
presumably refers to the production of at least subsistence levels of existence. See also Messerschmidt's similar comments on traditional govermnance procedures in Nepalese villages (CP, pp. 473-474).
The authors also mention many social criteria with which to evaluate
common-property use, such as social cohesion or the encouragement of
community norms. For example, McCay (QC) offers a study of an inshore
fishery in the United States that was managed as a commons during the
1940s and 1950s. She regards the effort as having been successful because
it "served community norms about the fair distribution of rewards as well
7. Blum, The InternalStructure and Polity of the European Village Community from the Fifteenth
to the Nineteenth Century, 43 J. Modem Hist. 541-76 (1971).
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as use rights" (p. 214). This was despite the fact that the fishery was
wiped out, requiring those who depended on it to find new employment.
In sum, these papers use a diverse set of possible criteria for evaluating
commons use. Nevertheless, questions abound. The criterion of economic
efficiency, or how much a resource can contribute to the long-run economic welfare of a society, is entirely neglected on grounds, correct or
not, that it has been preempted by those who argue for privatization. Nor
is attention given to problems caused by having to trade off performance
on one criterion with that on others.
V
There is a strong tendency among the authors of these volumes to
regard common-property use as characterized by relatively more consensual and voluntaristic decision processes, and for individual property to
involve relatively more competition and conflict, but not in a totally naive
fashion, of course. There are plenty of references to conflicts among
commons users. This viewpoint stems perhaps from a more general view
that makes common property just one manifestation of a wider set of
social factors variously called cultural solidarity, social conviviality, egalitarianism, communitarianism, reciprocity, and so on.
Many authors regard common-property institutions as promoting cooperative values, and individual property as fostering individualistic values. Campbell and Godoy (CP, p. 343) conclude that using land in common
nurtures "a sense of corporate identity and solidarity . . ." Fernandez
(QC, p. 287) says that common property "is the only satisfactory arena
for truly long-term, confident cooperative acts." A conceptual legitimacy
for these views has apparently been provided by Runge (CP), who argues
that in modeling common-property situations, prisoners' dilemma games
ought to be replaced by games with multiple Nash equilibria. Then managing the commons could become a search for superior equilibria through
reasonably sedate procedures involving signaling, assurance, etc.
On the other hand, the papers are filled with examples that directly
contradict this relationship. One is struck by the ubiquitous reference to
the use of coercion in managing access to common resources. Coercion
comes in many forms: straightforward monetary penalties (Ostrom, QC;
Arnold and Campbell, CP); destruction of equipment (Acheson, QC);
social ostracism (Taylor, QC; Kisangani, CP); banishment (McKean, CP);
stigmatization (Mahdi, CP); withdrawal of access rights (Easter and Palanisami, CP); and so on. McKean goes so far as to characterize commons
governance in Tokugawa, Japan, as "fairly totalitarian." Indeed most of
the successful examples of commons management described in these
books show that the ability of local groups to coerce and sanction behavior
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was a necessary condition for this success. In fact, Artz et al. (CP)
conclude, from their study of grazing lands in Morocco, that traditional,
tribal institutions had greater sanctioning power than those of the modem
state, largely because these traditional groups had more incentive to operate sanctions. Many instances of failure in common-property management are attributed by these authors to the undermining of local sanctioning
powers when political authority is shifted upwards; Thomson et al. (CP)
give a good and representative history of this for a case in Niger.
There is another important dimension of the relationship between common property and coercion. Effective commons use requires not only
effective management within the group, but effective exclusion of outsiders, or would-be encroachers. Many of the authors stress this; for
example, Easter and Palanisami (CP) on India; Mahdi (CP) on Morocco;
Wynne (CP) on Botswana; Acheson (QC); Berkes (QC) on the Cree
Indians of Canada; Stocks (QC) on the Amazon; and Brightman (QC) on
the Algonquian Indians. When commons-using groups are unable to coerce
potential encroachers, that is, exclude them to an effective extent, then
their efforts to reduce use rates to efficient levels are undermined.
How are we to reconcile the widespread view that successful commonproperty institutions rely on cooperation and voluntarism with the equally
widespread empirical finding that success depends on the ability of governing groups to coerce themselves as well as encroachers? If the empirical
observations are correct, then our only recourse is to revise our notions
about common-property governance processes. The data cast doubt on
the possibility that common property may be modeled as situations in
which there are no opposing interests among individuals, and no need to
take action against free riding. The ubiquity of coercive local governance
institutions suggests that free riding is indeed a problem even in the
commons-using societies studied by these authors. 8 Many of the commons-managing organizations mentioned in these volumes have operated
for long periods of time-long enough so that procedures and social
interactions have become familiar and routinized. In this case, it is perhaps
easy to mistake this routinization for strictly voluntary, uncoerced behavior.
VI
It is another very common theme of these papers, sometimes expressed
directly and sometimes in passing, that there is often a discrepancy between the rules of resource use, as they are expressed in formal laws or
8. It is interesting that the reluctance to recognize and study coercion is also characteristic of
strict neoclassical approaches.
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customs, and the actual observed patterns of resource use; between resource use de jure and de facto. In fact, this is mentioned so often that
it would seem to be a central feature of natural resource commons. Some
of these discrepancies are minor, some are major. Acheson's (QC) paper,
stemming from his well-known work on Maine lobster territories, shows
people engaging in exclusion that is technically illegal. Taylor's (QC)
paper on Irish fishing rights has already been mentioned. The paper by
Mahdi (CP) on collective water management in Morocco also stresses
this point. Nor is the discrepancy between de jure and de facto rights
simply a matter of occasional individual infringement. Papers by Easter
and Palanisami (CP) on irrigation in India; and by Blaikie et al. (CP) on
land rights in India, show that breaking the formal rules can often be a
collective, publicly sanctioned activity. Several papers (Anderson (QC)

on Malaysia; Pinkerton (QC) on British Columbia; and Durrenberger and
Palsson (QC) on Icelandic fisheries) look closely at the interrelationships
among levels of governance-local versus regional or national-and their

implications for commons management. A major problem in these cases
concerns conflicts among formal rights as they are stated in national laws
and informal rights as they have evolved locally.

The fact that many commons situations often involve major discrepancies between rights de jure and rights de facto has some important
implications. None of the authors had the objective of tracing out these
implications, but it might be interesting briefly to pursue this idea here.
The discrepancy very substantially complicates the job of sorting out
relevant property concepts and identifying causal linkages among variables. For example, one way that many have sought to make sense of
property institutions is to use the three-tier classification: action level,
institutional level, and constitutional or policy level. It is a typology put
forth by Wantrup in his seminal text. 9 The institutional level consists of
the formal legal rules while the actual use patterns occur on the action
level. The problem is that we normally think of the institutional level as
setting boundaries, or constraints, on the action level. This seems to give
coherence to the whole enterprise. Societies decide, at the constitutional
level, on what rules to have; people then go about maximizing utilities
and wealth within these rules. In this perspective, then, the study of
property institutions is the study of property laws. But the studies in these
books show that property laws are seldom binding, even in countries like
the United States where the "rule of law" is supposedly paramount (cf.
Acheson, QC). In many cases they are not even approximately binding;
behavior on the action level is exactly the opposite from that prescribed

in law. It is decisions made on the action level, in fact, that determine
9. S. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation, Economics and Policies (1952).
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whether and to what extent laws will be enforced.'" This implies that the
extent to which formal laws are constraining is actually determined by
events on the action level as much as it is by the laws themselves.
Closely related to this issue is the attempt to use legal categories of
property institutions to analyze actual property practices. Not only are
property typologies inherently inflexible in the face of the immense number and variety of real-world property relationships, but they do not
address this discrepancy between de facto and de jure rights. Many of
the authors in these volumes use the common-property/open-access dichotomy proposed by Wantrup and Bishop." This categorization helped
to focus our attention on an important dimension of communal property
institutions. The problem is that this distinction can be taken both as a
legal specification and as a statement about actual use, and these are
different. Legal categories are discrete; resource use characteristics are
continuous. Resources that are technically common property may actually
have unrestricted access, and even when access is restricted, it will seldom
pay to restrict outsiders completely. Open-access resources in law may
actually be appropriated by groups or individuals who exclude others.
Consider the Roman property categories res nullius, res communes,
res publicae, and so on. These have come to be widely quoted by natural
resource economists to describe alternative resource access characteristics. But while these may have been reasonably clear in legal doctrine,
they were much less so in practice. In fact, exclusion was often possible
on those resources that were supposed to be open to all (res communes),
while some types of resources that were nominally common property (res
publicae) were not subject to exclusion in practice.' 2 One scholar has
concluded, in fact, "All this is very confused. The distinction between
things common and things public is ill-defined and has no practical value"' 3
(Lee, p. 109). The problem lies in trying to fit actual property-use patterns
into a set of legal categories. The study of such categories will never
suffice to explain the actual behavior we see. For this we also need to
look at political and organizational resources, perhaps at psychological
factors, and most assuredly at the real costs and benefits impinging on
those who use common-property resources. If the study of actual property
10. Cf. Field, On the Explanation of Rules Using Rational Choice Models, 13 J.Econ. Issues,
March 1979, at 49-72.
I . Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy, 15
Nat. Res. J.713-27 (1975).
12. Roman property law has been well studied, but there remain wide disagreements on many
of the details, especially on how the law evolved through time. See, W. Burdick, The Principles of
Roman Law and Their Relation to Modem Law (1938); A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of
Roman Law (1953) (American Philosophical Society); J.Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (1976)
(Amsterdam). For an appreciation of the complexity of the subject, see the discussion of the legal
status of the Roman seashore in W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law (1932) (Cambridge).
13. R. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law (1952) (London).
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use is to be our objective, then the legal analysis of property rights
becomes, not the main object of the analysis, but only one of the whole
gamut of socio/politicalleconomic factors determining realized rights.
That is to say, perhaps paradoxically, that effective institutional analysis
must begin with thorough study of actual resource use patterns.
VI

Given the fact that the majority of the papers deal with less developed
societies, one would perhaps have expected considerable discussion of
the relationship between common-property resources and economic growth.
That is a theme, however, which is conspicuously absent from the papers.
If anything, in fact, -the authors lean toward placing common-property
institutions outside the forces of economic growth. A recurrent observation
is that common-property regimes are most likely to be successful in
settled, static, socioeconomic situations. This is stressed by Ostrom (QC)
as a conceptual matter, and is illustrated in many of the papers (e.g.,
Cordell and McKean (CP) on sea tenure in Brazil; Cruz (CP) on fishing
in the Philippines; Kisangani (CP) on the African elephant; Thomson et
al. (CP) on forest resources in Niger and Thailand; and Artz et al. (CP)
on grazing lands in Morocco).
Many of the authors attribute the collapse of stable common-property
regimes to the intrusion of outside forces that cannot be controlled. These
are often situations of overwhelming population intrusion, or of vastly
more effective technology that allows new groups to gain the ascendancy.
In these cases, property-rights systems are probably not the issue. Roughly
the same outcomes would have occurred no matter what property rights
were employed by the original group.
The more subtle, but interesting question, is the relationship of common-property institutions to economic growth, and here there is a dearth
of serious commentary and analysis. Bromley notes (CP, p. 594) that
common-property systems are often found among groups who for one
reason or another have been excluded from the dynamic portions of
resource-based societies, and who are living static but marginal lives on
the economic periphery. To what extent the property system itself accounts
for this is unclear, nor does it seem to be a question of interest. The
observation that common-property institutions are better adapted to static
situations would seem to imply that they may not be conducive to solving
the problems cast up by the forces of economic growth. Effective common-property systems require great attention be paid to division problems
among commoners, that is, to questions of dividing wealth and income
among those having partial claims to it. Settled situations place fewer
demands on these and other governance issues. Changing situations cast
up new claims and novel problems that customary decision procedures
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have difficulty resolving. Papers by Berkes (CP) and Gupta (CP) illustrate
this problem well. They show the increased difficulty that common-property governance procedures have experienced when faced with the increased economic heterogeneity among commoners that came with economic
growth. 4
Without doubt, we need to study common-property regimes from a
more dynamic perspective. Not just situations where new "outside" forces
have wiped out local natural resource commons, but more in-depth cases
of how particular commons governance procedures were adapted, or not,
to changing situations. Several of the papers offer insight in this direction.
Papers by Campbell and Godoy (CP) and Ostrom (QC) are comparative
analyses of common-property resources in different societies. The comparative perspective is valuable because it leads one naturally to the
question of origins, which is a dynamic perspective. In a different kind
of comparison that is equally revealing, there are two papers (by Arnold
and Campbell (CP), and by Messerschmidt (CP)) on the panchayatsystem
of forestry management in Nepal. This system has been introduced and
fostered by some of the heavy hitters among economic development
agencies (FAO, World Bank, etc.). It is most impressive how apparently
different positions and roles within these development initiatives can lead
to very different evaluations of their performance. A very interesting paper
by Bauer (QC) on agricultural villages in Ethiopia describes how residents
voluntarily shifted tenure systems back and forth between common property and individual property in response to population growth and decline.
His observation: "Villages apparently instituted [common-property tenures] when they needed more people-for a variety of reasons, including
political power.... Communities instituted [individual tenures] when
they wanted to limit the influx of population ...... Another interesting
case is covered by Vondal (QC): in certain villages of Borneo land is
divided and used in individual holdings during the dry season; during the
wet season, however, the waters above these lands become common
property. On the whole, however, the papers shy away from the dynamic
perspective of economic growth.
Perhaps the main reason why these papers say little about growth is
because the authors themselves have not come to terms with growth, its
causes, consequences, desirability,, and potential. A statement by Campbell and Godoy after their comparative analysis of common fields in
England and Peru brings this out: "Should contemporary . . . common
fields be condemned . . . as an obstacle to progress and a cause of rural
poverty and backwardness? Or should stress be placed upon the delicate
ecological balance that they undoubtedly help to maintain ... and the
14. There has been much recent scholarship on the problems of heterogeneity among common
users of a resource.
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sense of corporate identity and solidarity that they nurture
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For the economists these volumes contain a wealth of observation and
detail on real-world natural-resource commons around the world. But the
rejection of standard economic approaches in looking at these commons,
on the legitimate grounds that the approaches are too limited in the range
of phenomena they can encompass, leaves things in a rather amorphous
state. One is left wondering how the borders of inquiry can be pushed
back without sacrificing the rigor and organizing power of the conventional approaches.
Perhaps one path ahead is provided by the major thread running through
these papers: the emphasis on commons-managing organizations, that is,
ownership groups whose primary role, whether pursued effectively or
not, is to manage the resources held in common. The importance of such
governance institutions is documented by many of the papers in these
books. Chief among these are the paper by Wade (CP) on water use in
Indian villages, by Hunt (CP) on irrigation in Egypt, and by McKean
(CP) on traditional commons-managing groups in Japan. But many other
papers contain references to, and descriptions of, commons-managing
organizations. It is the promise of these institutions that is generally looked
on by these authors as the counter to the emphasis on either privatization
or management by central political authorities.
For economists, the obvious challenge is to bring to the study of
common property the elements of organizational and collective decisions.
Restraint in the use of a common-property resource is a public good; rent
dissipation is its undersupply. We need to look at commons organizations,
therefore, as public goods supplying collectivities. It is problematic whether
current economic models of collective choice can provide the necessary
theoretical foundation for this work. Of course, no comprehensive models
exist. Instead there are bits and pieces everywhere: game theory, public
choice, theory of clubs, oligopoly models, transactions costs, and many
new theories of the firm which stress the collective nature of their decisions. But while these models may provide insights into various facets
of the overall problem, they may be too abstract to function in the integrated richness of the real world. They may also simply lack key elements, such as the importance of prior developmental paths (i.e., history),
and the strength of political and social identifications. Having said this,
however, it would still seem worthwhile to see what might be accomplished through augmenting standard models of common property with
elements of collective choice models.
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